attempts which the "bourgeois nationalists" had made to bring together the Ukrainians of the east and of the west. They declared that the preceding group had sought to bring back capitalism and to separate Ukrainian from the "brotherly" Russian and to remodel it on Polish and German standards. They attacked any system of orthography and transliteration which differed from that used in Russian and in their attacks on Polonisms in Ukrainian they went so far as to call Polish any Ukrainian form which differed from the Russian, even when the Polish word in fact had the same form as the Russian and differed from the Ukrainian.

In the small dictionaries that were printed only those words were admitted that revealed Russian relations and the academician Krymsky once remarked of one of these that it was merely a Russian-Russian dictionary, so far had the process been carried.

In 1933 Khvylya published a new orthography for Ukrainian. This repudiated the work that had been done earlier to bring together Eastern and Western Ukrainian and sought to take as the standard those Ukrainian dialects that had been most thoroughly russianized, although at the same time he carefully avoided explaining the policy on which he was working.

Thus, during these years there developed a definite policy of disintegrating the language from within. It was based very definitely upon the old theories of the nineteenth century, that Ukrainian was merely a corrupt form of Russian and could not have any independent development, but such a statement which would have satisfied Nicholas I and Belinsky was not expressed clearly. It was enveloped in a mass of Communist jargon which appealed to the great names of Bolshevik ideology and covered a complete ignorance of any of the facts of language or of popular usage.

At the same time in another field Postyshev saw the opportunity to deliver further blows under the guise of progress and of satisfying Ukrainian aspirations. He moved the capital of the Ukrainian Republic back to Kiev from Kharkiv.[1] There were good reasons for this. The Soviet regime had been established at Kharkiv, because it was nearer to the Russian boundary and hence could more easily receive support from Russian military sources during the

[1] [1933 -- Analyst]

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633 civil war. Kiev, as the centre of traditional Ukrainian life, was more liable to sympathy with the Ukrainian national movement, as the Russians had found on more than one occasion. Now, with the country prostrate, it seemed advisable for the Communists to mark their triumph and endeavor to identify themselves with the masses by recognizing Kiev.

Yet, it brought with it another blow to Ukrainian prestige. Of all the cities in Ukraine, Kiev was the richest in the monuments of the past. Therefore, to mark the Communist triumph, they decided to rebuild large portions of the city and to erect buildings that would be worthy of the new regime. It was easy to find as the proper sites the areas where the old Kiev had stood.

346 661 633 From the very first days of Bolshevism and Communism, the regime, with its atheistic trends, had devoted itself to the robbing of the churches. Even the ikonostasis of St. Sophia had been melted down to recover the gold ornaments with which it had been decorated. The museums had been largely pillaged. Some of the contents had been removed to Moscow on various pretexts, but still more had been wantonly destroyed.

Now work began in earnest to wreck the surviving monuments of the past. In quick succession the Communists ruined, blew up or levelled a large number of churches which spoke too strongly of the past greatness of Kiev and the Ukrainians. These included the Cathedral Church of the Golden Domed Monastery of St. Michael of the twelfth century, with a bell-tower of the seventeenth, the Church of the Three Saints of the twelfth century, the cloisters of the Monastery of St. Irena of the eleventh century, the finest monuments of the period of Mazepa at the end of the seventeenth century, including the Cathedrals of the Theophany of the Brotherhood Monastery and the "Great Nicholas" of the Ustyno-Mykolayiv Monastery, the work of the architect Joseph Startsev, with a bell-tower of the late eighteenth or the early nineteenth century, the "Little Nicholas" and the Church of St. George of the eighteenth century, a large number of structures of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, of the Kievan-Mezhyhirye Monastery of the Transfiguration, the Church of Sts. Peter and Paul in Podil of

[1933 - Ukraine capital was moved to Kiev from Kharkiv -- Analyst]

the eighteenth century, the bell-tower of the Kiev-Kiril-Troitsky Monastery of the eighteenth century built by the architect Ivan Hryhorovych-Barsky, the Church of Sts. Borys and Hlib of the eighteenth century, the Church of the Birth of Christ and the "good Nicholas," built by Andry Melensky at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Church of the Tithes, the celebrated statue of Samson by Hryhorovych-Barsky, and a long series of other monuments and buildings.

Almost all of these buildings came from those periods when the Ukrainians were the most free from Russian influence or, as in the case of the Mazepa baroque, had the closest contacts with the West. It was a deliberate part of the Communist attempt to rewrite the Ukrainian past.

Of course, their excuse was that the old primarily ecclesiastical culture stood in marked contradiction to the modern era of industrialization and collectivization, the "glorious age of Stalin" which called for the development of a new type of architecture. Still, in a surprising number of cases these new buildings did not make their appearance and the ground was left empty or covered with insignificant structures which could better have been placed on the site of those half-ruined shacks and hovels which were the real expressions of the Communist paradise.

The primary object was the annihilation of the Ukrainian spirit and represented part of the broad general movement which had been launched for the rerussification of the country and the stopping in every way of that spontaneous outburst of development which had been called into being by the downfall of tsarism and the founding of the Ukrainian National Republic. The general debacle was now complete.

Within four years, before the ending of the first Five Year Plan a situation had been brought about which seemed to the Soviet authorities a guarantee of their final victory over what they were pleased to call bourgeois nationalism but which was, in realty, the logical outgrowth of the Ukrainian aspirations throughout the centuries.

[in destruction of churches & monuments of past in Kiev--Analyst

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In addition to difficulties presented by the great gaps in material and human resources, there was a continued danger from the "booby traps" of hidden explosive mines and camouflaged Communist agents. The latter were not discovered for some time, but on the fifth day after the German occupation, a large number of mines blew up a considerable section of the center of the city, thoroughly disrupting the work of the Germans and Ukrainians in reestablishing an ordered pattern of life.[4]

Immediately after arriving in Kiev, a council of the Mel'nyk leaders—Konyk and Captain Soretits'kyi, who came in the Wehrmacht service, and Iaroslav Haivaz and Roman Bidar, who apparently came without official authorization—decided to install a *Hilfsbürgermeister,* or chief of the municipal administrative apparatus. They chose Alexander Ohloblyn, a well-known historian of the Soviet period. The Wehrmacht authorities readily accepted the council's nomination,[5] an indication of the close cooperation of the OUN-M with the army authorities in the East Ukraine at that time.

Ohloblyn's authority, however, was soon to prove illusory. Volodymyr Bahazii, an instructor from the pedagogical institute, had been appointed as his deputy. Unlike Ohloblyn, Bahazii had greeted the Nationalist leaders and immediately sought to identify himself with them. They soon learned that he was highly ambitious and that he did not stop at attacking his nominal superior, whom he accused of Russophile tendencies.[6] Apparently Bahazii's loyalty to the OUN and his energy in carrying out the reorganization of city life made him indispensable. At any rate, Professor Ohloblyn was soon pushed into the background,[7] and at the end of October, after a disagreement with the German authorities concerning measures to be taken to enhance the welfare of Kiev's citizens, he resigned.[8] Bahazii then became the

[4] Forostivs'kyi, p. 24; PS 053.
[5] Interviews 56, 65.
[6] Interviews 56, 65.
[7] This is evident even in contemporary published accounts. Cf. *Nastup,* November 8, 1941, pp. 3–5, containing an article written by Petro (Peter) Oliïnyk earlier in Kiev, in which Bahazii is described as the "business manager." *Ukraïns'kyi Visnyk,* October 26, 1941, p. 6, describes a meeting of the department heads of the city administration which Ohloblyn opened, but over which Bahazii presided.
[8] Interview 56.

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chief of administration.[9] Having achieved this post, he repaid the organization which had assisted him by using his influence to secure the adherence to the OUN-M of the most important officials.[10]

While most of the economic and cultural divisions of the city government were left in the hands of local men, the OUN forces took care to organize the most important branches—propaganda and police—under their own followers. Zakhvalins'kyi was brought from Zhitomir to take command of the police units, but after a short period, in which his alleged incompetence and dissolute life made him objectionable to his party, he was replaced by one of the Galician leaders, Roman Bidar. Kandyba soon arrived to take charge of propaganda activity. With him came the staff of *Ukraïns'ke Slovo,* headed by John Rohach. The newspaper was to be printed in Kiev, but the destruction of the principal press by the explosions forced the editors to continue publication for some weeks in Zhitomir.[11]

Having captured Kiev, the German armies rapidly pushed on to the east, taking with them most of the interpreters and advisers who had formed an essential part of the OUN-M "conquest" of Zhitomir and Kiev. By the end of October, they had reached Kharkov, where Konyk took the lead in propaganda work. He and his assistants succeeded in recruiting a considerable number of the local intelligentsia for their organization but, as will be shown later, failed in their attempt to attain a high degree of success similar to that in Kiev.[12]

Lest repeated reference to collaboration of the Mel'nyk forces with the Wehrmacht lead to an exaggerated conception of the role of the OUN-M in the operations of the German army, it should be pointed out that the latter employed many Slavic interpreters and advisers in addition to the Mel'nyk followers. Some of these were Ukrainians, of all political persuasions, including Bandera supporters. Strong efforts were made to get rid of the latter after the decision to suppress their party, but for a

[9] Bahazii assumed the post on November 1 (*Nastup,* December 20, 1941, p. 2).
[10] Interviews 53, 65.
[11] Iurii Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti,* January 21, 1942, p. 2; *Nastup,* November 8, 1941, p. 3; Interview 65.
[12] See Chapter X.

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186 permitted to determine his own nationality. There was an enormous increase in the proportion of persons claiming Ukrainian nationality as compared to the Soviet census of 1926, which had been conducted in the same fashion. That many factors were involved in the shift is indicated by the extreme variations from city to city, which will be touched upon in a later chapter. There [626] is, moreover, little doubt that pressures, ranging from fear of the nationalist-dominated police (which, in Zhitomir at least, took the census) to desire to obtain material benefits reserved for Ukrainians only, were significant. There is no question, however, that a large number of those who claimed Ukrainian nationality in 1941–42 were influenced by a desire to "climb upon the band wagon" by obtaining affiliation with the national group which they thought would be in favor in the future. The nationalist mayor of Kiev, Leontii Forostivs'kyi, during whose administration the census in the capital was taken, freely admits the importance of this factor.[7]

●633 From a material standpoint, too, the municipal administration played a considerable role in the provision of support for nationalist activity. The funds at its disposal were not inconsiderable, the Kharkov city budget amounting to the equivalent of some eight million dollars annually.[8] The number of municipal employees was also sizable. In Kiev the total under Bahazii's direction, evidently largely dependent on the central municipal authority for their positions, was twenty thousand.[9] This figure was regarded as so excessive by the Germans that it figured in the charges made against him, but several months after his arrest the number employed by the city—apparently the purely administrative branches only, exclusive of education and manufacturing and commercial enterprises—was still 1,138, and 1,065 more were working for the *raions*.[10] Even the smaller figures are quite significant in a city whose total population had by that time sunk to 350,000, an extremely small percentage of which consisted of

[7] Leontii Forostivs'kyi, *Kyiv pid vorozhymy okupatsiiamy* (Kiev under Enemy Occupations) (Buenos Aires: Mykola Denysiuk, 1952), p. 50.

[8] *L'vivs'ki Visti*, May 23–24, 1943, p. 2, quotes Mayor Semenenko as saying the budget for the last quarter of 1942 totaled 50,000,000 *karbovontsi* (10 *k.* = 1 RM = $0.40).

[9] PS 192.

[10] *Ukraïns'ka Diiisnist'*, May 10, 1942, p. 1.

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employable men. From the point of view of political sentiment, as will be shown, the composition of the administrative force made it even more significant, for over one fourth were of the upper levels of the intelligentsia—those having a higher education—while another 35 percent were probably of the Soviet "intelligentsia," since they possessed secondary educations.[11] The city administrations, with their appurtenances of schools and publications, thus served as refuges for the intellectual class in general, which was shorn of its customary economic role by the terrible dislocations of war. Consequently the orientation of the structure in which they found a place could play a vital role in determining the direction this group's sentiments would take.

At least two East Ukrainian mayors,[12] in addition to Bahazii, lost their lives for too ardent devotion to the nationalist cause. Even when they were not in conflict with the occupying power, the mayors knew that their positions singled them out for Communist vengeance, from either secret agents or the returning Red Army. That a considerable group of officials was found to remain true to the nationalist cause—even if a bit timidly at times—is an indication that a considerable reservoir of leadership for nationalism existed in the East Ukraine.

While the city administration as a whole was both a symbol of Ukrainian nationalist ascendancy and an instrument for advancing the nationalist cause, the individual departments were frequently of equal or greater significance. Their importance derived in large measure from the fact that administrative divisions entrusted with very important functions were frequently operated in considerable independence of the central municipal administration.

In practice the amount of authority exercised by any major official depended more on his own character and his relations with the German authorities than upon any formal apportionment of power. This was especially the case in the large cities, where in addition to the *Stadtkommissar* who stood above the native mayor, there were German officials in charge of each of

[11] *Ibid.*

[12] In Kamenets-Podolsk and Poltava.

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the departments of administration. In such cases the department heads who were on good terms with their German superiors seem to have been able to pursue courses substantially independent of the mayor, and this was also to an extent true of the firmer or more clever of those who wished to exert their own authority even without special German support. Consequently, it sometimes happened that one or more sections of a municipal administration were strongholds of nationalist activity, while the city as a whole was administered by elements opposed to Ukrainian independence.

Under the Soviet system, the municipal administrations had included departments of finance, communal economy, internal trade, health, popular education, social security, and cadres, as well as a general department, a planning commission, and sometimes departments of local manufacturing and agriculture. In the city administrations under German occupation, there was evidently some consolidation of departments, but in general the Soviet division was little changed, except for the elimination of the planning commission. On the other hand, several new departments were added for functions which had been performed by higher Soviet administrative levels but which the Germans wished to allocate, under their own control, to the cities. One was the propaganda department, which will be discussed somewhat later. Another was the juridical department, which operated a system of lower courts.[13] It was, however, of little or no importance as a channel of nationalist activity. Much more significant in this respect were the police departments. Some indications of their activity in nationalist affairs have already been given. The Germans, of course, exerted great efforts to keep this element of authority, the only branch of the local administration which could have offered armed resistance to their rule, under firm control. Since the police power was regularly in the hands of German SP officials, who frequently maintained only a nominal subordination to the *Stadtkommissar,* the Ukrainian chief of this department was correspondingly independent of the mayor.

[13] On the legal system in the Reichskommissariat, see Nicholas Laskovs'kyi, "Practicing Law in the Occupied Ukraine," *American Slavic and East European Review,* XI (April, 1952), 124 ff.

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Moreover, since there were several German police authorities— ordinary security police, secret police, railway police—operating in the same area, unified at the top but having different Ukrainian subchiefs operating under them, the possibility of several competing or antagonistic influences existed. In spite of the special concern of the Reichskommissariat to root out all OUN members in the police, the latter were able for many months to maintain their positions in several cities. For example, while the city administrations of Vinnitsa and Dniepropetrovsk were in the hands of Russophile elements opposed to Ukrainian nationalism, the police chief in the former city[14] and the Ukrainian in charge of the secret police in the latter[15] were supporters of the OUN. Close as was the supervision of the German police authorities, it was obviously impossible for them to watch every action of their subordinates, so that possession of such support within the police force was of great value to the nationalist groups.

In the wave of repression in Kiev in December, 1941, the fact that his sympathizers controlled the police in the *raion* in which he was arrested allowed the chief of the OUN-M in the East Ukraine, Dr. Kandyba, to secure his release, thus enabling him to prolong his activities for more than two years.[16] Moreover, the presence of nationalist elements in the police force served to prevent the control of these groups by secret Communist agents, who were successful in penetrating the police in a number of places in the southern Ukraine, and for a while in Kiev itself, through the German practice of retaining the Soviet *militsiia* as a matter of convenience.[17] Whatever value the nationalist penetration of the police force may have had in this connection was largely offset by the odium which attached to the nationalist groups when it became known to the population that they were collaborating with the Germans in this fashion. Moreover, the ill repute of the police was sometimes increased by the actions of the nationalists themselves who used the police as an instrument for terrorizing non-Ukrainians.[18]

[14] Interview 1.
[15] Interviews 1, 18.
[16] L. Dniprova, article in *Ukraïns'ke Slovo* (Paris), June 18, 1950, p. 3.
[17] Interview 59.
[18] It is said that the Ukrainian police in Kiev, when ordered to secure hostages

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led the organization after the West Ukrainian and émigré leaders had been forced to withdraw, was an engineer. On the whole, however, it may be said that engineers were more concerned with material reconstruction than politics, and did not play proportionately as significant a role as did engineers in the nationalist movements abroad and in Galicia.

The predominance of intellectuals and technical specialists in the nationalist movement imparted a certain specific color to the activities. In the first place, from the purely administrative point of view, the lack of trained men was a serious handicap. While the purely material aspects of city life were carried on about as well as might have been hoped in view of the destruction, shortages, and German obstruction, the conduct of public administration was far from adequate. This was, indeed, one of the major causes of the downfall of the OUN-M regime in Kiev, whether the worst defects consisted of favoritism and speculation by officials, or simply poor organizational and human relations. Nationalist fervor, enthusiasm, facility in the use of literary Ukrainian, were no substitutes for managerial skills and personnel psychology. Yet it was precisely these abilities which intellectuals who were excluded from public life, as were Soviet Ukrainian educators suspected of adherence to the Skrypnyk group, could not acquire. At the same time, so much of their energy had been turned in upon their academic and cultural cultivation of things Ukrainian, such as language and history, that the intellectuals failed to place the emotional and abstract aspects of the nationalist cause in a balanced framework when the opportunity for action arose. It cannot be said that the intellectuals were less courageous than others might have been in striving for national ends in the face of German terrorism; many lost their lives, although, as has been pointed out in the case of some of the small-city editors, others were sometimes found to act as pliant tools for the occupiers. It does, however, appear that persons more inclined to take a functional instead of an emotional approach to administration might have been more successful in evading German demands.

Very striking is the almost total lack of legal expression among almost all participants in administrative work. Probably the basic reason for this omission was that lawyers were few and far between among non-Communist elements in the Ukraine. A con-

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been curbed by a stronger legal tradition. Perhaps by coincidence the administrations in Zhitomir and Kharkov were comparatively tolerant of minority groups, and awakened no such violent opposition from Russophile elements as in Kiev. Indeed, as has already been pointed out, the Zhitomir administration in 1941 included a Pole and a Russian in prominent posts, apparently working in harmony with other officials, while the nationalist group in Kharkov during the occupation attracted the lasting support of at least one academician of Russian origin. These groups were also able to avoid destruction by the Germans, in spite of considerable harassment, perhaps because their activities were not so violent as to arouse the public outcry which served as an excuse for the attack on the Kiev group.

The severe shortage of lawyers was paralleled by an even greater lack of administrators with experience in posts of great responsibility. This deficiency doubtless arose primarily from the fact that persons holding high administrative posts were almost universally strong adherents of the Communist regime. In a number of cases, leading Soviet officials such as chairmen of city soviets organized underground sabotage against German installations or led partisan groups for the Communist cause, and the large majority no doubt evacuated with the Red Army. It would have been difficult in any case for such a highly placed member of the Soviet regime to join the nationalist cause, as he would probably have been executed in short order by the *Einsatzgruppen*, whose tasks included the killing of all "kommissars." Nevertheless, it is worth remarking that no Soviet military, party, or state official of any importance, as far as is known to the present writer, ever joined the Ukrainian nationalist cause, either through the local groups in the East Ukraine or through the prisoner-of-war camps, although several from these groups did join the Vlasov movement.

What the East Ukraine lacked in trained legal and administrative personnel, the West Ukrainian organizers failed to supply. Indeed, they appear not to have seen the need. They recognized the desirability of sending in journalists (the West Ukrainians were more effective as editors, although the extremely propa-

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gandistic nature of much of their work exacerbated the defects already existing in the intellectual nationalist tendencies in the east).[20] They also recognized the need for trained military officers to lead the police units, as well as for organizers of cooperatives, merchants, and other personnel to reorganize economic life.[21] Since the Galicians, unlike their East Ukrainian fellows, had been brought up under the influence of the Roman law tradition transmitted by the Austrian administration and the Catholic Church, one might have thought that they would provide a balancing element of legal thought. Actually, although there were numerous lawyers in the legal parties in Galicia, lawyers were even rarer among OUN leaders than among prominent East Ukrainians. Moreover, the whole current of revolutionary romanticism and the glorification of "illegalism" necessarily militated against the development of legalistic elements in the thinking of the nationalist factions. At the same time, of course, underground oppositional work had afforded the western group no experience in the responsibilities of public administration; the older émigrés who might have provided a modicum of such experience were kept out of the East Ukraine by the Germans. As the following statistics on the émigré group in Bohemia-Moravia indicate, however, the possible supply was not great, even if one accepts the figures which were obtained by listing, presumably at their own valuation, persons available to return to the East Ukraine in 1941.[22]

[20] Iu. Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, November 6, 1941, p. 2.

[21] *Ibid.*

[22] From a registration by a Ukrainian community organization in Prague, September 28, 1941 (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, October 4, 1941, p. 3). For comparison, the occupations of the postwar emigration (largely West rather than East Ukrainian, in contrast to the interwar émigré group) may be given:

	ÉMIGRÉS IN GERMANY	
	U. S. Zone (total 85,646)	*British Zone (total 44,987)*
Peasants	30 percent	44 percent
Workers	16	21
Artisans	18	14
Intellectuals	23	8
Miscellaneous	13	13

(Michael Pap, *Die Probleme der ukrainischen Staatlichkeit und der Emigration*, Inaugural Dissertation zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde vorgelegt der Hohen Philosophischen Fakultät der Ruperts-Carola Universität zu Heidelberg, 1948 [Typescript available in the Library of Congress]).

[Ukrainian constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

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a Department of Cultural and Educational Work
a Department of Roads
a Department of Public Health
a Department of Public Education
a General Department
a Department of Agriculture
a Department of Social Maintenance
a Department of Trade
a Department of Finance
a Planning Commission
a Cadres Sector

under the Chairman of the Executive Committees and, in addition, in accordance with the specific features of the economy of the district, the district Soviets of Working People's Deputies set up the following Departments, subject to confirmation by the respective regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies:

a Department of the Municipal Economy
a Department of Local Industry.

625 Art. 74. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of State Security set up their Departments under the district Soviets of Working People's Deputies in accordance with the conditions of the district, on the basis of the laws of the USSR and the Ukrainian SSR and subject to confirmation by the corresponding regional Soviet of Working People's Deputies.

Art. 75. The Departments of the district Soviets of Working People's Deputies are subordinate in their activities both to the district Soviets of Working People's Deputies and their Executive Committees and to the corresponding Departments of the regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies.

633 Art. 76. The city Soviets of Working People's Deputies set up the following Departments of their Executive Committees:

a Department of Cultural and Educational Work
a Department of Public Health
a Department of the Municipal Economy
a Department of Public Education
a General Department
a Department of Social Maintenance
a Department of Trade
a Department of Finance
a Planning Commission
a Cadres Sector

under the Chairman of the Executive Committee and, in addition, in accordance with the specific features of the city's industry and its municipal and suburban economy,

a Department of Local Industry and
a Department of Agriculture.

Art. 77. The Departments of the city Soviets of Working People's Deputies are subordinate in their activities both to the respective city Soviets of Working People's Deputies and their Executive Committees and to the corresponding Departments of the district Soviets of Working People's Deputies or directly to the corresponding Departments of the regional Soviets of Working People's Deputies.

Art. 78. The Departments of city Soviets of Working People's Deputies of Kiev are subordinate in their activities both to the Kiev Soviet of Working People's Deputies and its Executive Committee as well as to the corresponding Ministry of the Ukrainian SSR directly.